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Impairment in social interactions is a primary characteristic of people diagnosed
with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Although these individuals tend to orient less
to naturalistic social cues than do typically developing (TD) individuals, laboratory
experiments testing social orienting in ASD have been inconclusive, possibly because
of a failure to fully isolate reflexive (stimulus-driven) and voluntary (goal-directed) social
orienting processes. The purpose of the present study was to separately examine
potential reflexive and/or voluntary social orienting differences in individuals with ASD
relative to TD controls. Subjects (ages 7–14) with high-functioning ASD and a matched
control group completed three gaze cueing tasks on an iPad in which individuals briefly
saw a face with averted gaze followed by a target after a variable delay. Two tasks
were 100% predictive with either all congruent (target appears in gaze direction) or all
incongruent (target appears opposite from gaze direction) trials, respectively. Another
task was non-predictive with these same trials (half congruent and half incongruent)
intermixed randomly. Response times (RTs) to the target were used to calculate reflexive
(incongruent condition RT—congruent condition RT) and voluntary (non-predictive
condition RT—predictive condition RT) gaze cueing effects. Subjects also completed
two additional non-social orienting tasks (ProPoint and AntiPoint). Subjects with ASD
demonstrate intact reflexive but deficient voluntary gaze following. Similar results were
found in a separate test of non-social orienting. This suggests problems with using social
cues, but only in a goal-directed fashion, in our sample of high-functioning individuals
with ASD. Such findings may not only explain inconclusive previous findings but more
importantly be critical for understanding social dysfunctions in ASD and for developing
future interventions.
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INTRODUCTION
Social gaze cues are incredibly important for directing our attention toward relevant stimuli and
aiding us in our social interactions (Kleinke, 1986; Frischen et al., 2007). Given that autism
spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by problems with social interactions and communication,
it is no surprise that many studies of social attention suggest abnormalities in ASD. For instance,
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individuals with autism spend less time looking at eyes and more
time looking at mouths and objects while viewing live-action
movie clips (Klin et al., 2002) and spontaneously follow another
person’s changing head and eye movements markedly less than
typically-developing controls (Leekam et al., 1997). Since social
orienting behaviors are particularly important for understanding
the subtleties of social interactions, failure to properly engage
in social orienting may have serious consequences for everyday
social functioning, such as in engaging in joint attention
(Dawson et al., 1998), understanding others’ intended actions
(Castiello, 2003), developing Theory of Mind abilities (Charman
et al., 2000), and even acquiring language (Morales et al.,
2000; Pruett et al., 2011). Therefore, it is critical to better
understand underlying differences in autistic individuals’ social
orienting capabilities. This knowledge could potentially inform
the development of interventions and/or therapies for improving
social attention in individuals with autism, which in turn may
benefit some of these other key cognitive abilities.
In order to fully grasp the mechanisms underlying social
orienting and how these may be abnormal in ASD, it is helpful
to first understand how the typically-developing (TD) brain
processes and orients attention using non-social stimuli (Posner
et al., 1985). Non-social orienting can be thought of in terms
of two distinct processes: reflexive (automatic, stimulus-driven)
orienting and voluntary (goal-directed) orienting. According
to Sereno (1992)’s Tonic Inhibition Model (TIM), voluntary
orienting is largely governed by the prefrontal cortex, which,
via the basal ganglia, modulates the superior colliculus (thought
to be important for reflexive orienting). Consequently, the
ability to resist a reflexive response toward an illuminated
peripheral stimulus, such as in an antisaccade task, requires
additional inhibition of the reflexive orienting system by the
prefrontal cortex (i.e., the voluntary system;Munoz and Everling,
2004). An impairment or loss of this inhibition could result
in faster response times (or more impulsive responding) in
the direction of the stimulus as well as slower (and fewer)
responses to the opposite direction because a response in the
direction opposite from the stimulus requires sufficient voluntary
control.
Some have wondered whether social and non-social orienting
processes are unique and whether a reflexive and voluntary
distinction is also present in social orienting. Similar social
reflexive facilitation effects (i.e., faster responses to cued than
to non-cued locations) and voluntary facilitation effects (i.e.,
faster responses to predicted locations) as have been robustly
shown using peripheral non-social cues (e.g., Posner et al.,
1985) have also been shown using social cues (Friesen and
Kingstone, 1998; Friesen et al., 2004). Nevertheless, there are
distinct differences between social and non-social orienting
processes. For instance, the well-established inhibition of return
(IOR) effect in non-social reflexive orienting tasks, whereby
subjects become slower at responding to cued than non-cued
locations when the time between the cue and target is longer
than 300ms (Posner et al., 1985), appears to be absent in
social orienting tasks (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998). This could
be because the superior temporal sulcus (STS) is specifically
recruited for reflexive social orienting instead of the superior
colliculus for non-social orienting (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998).
The importance of the STS for only social orienting is supported
by a neuropsychological case study of a patient with a lesion to
the right STS who demonstrated the well-established reflexive
facilitation effect to non-predictive, non-social stimuli, but not
to social stimuli (Akiyama et al., 2006). This dissociation strongly
suggests that the social orienting system is not identical to the
non-social orienting system.
Although social and non-social orienting involve separable
systems, social orienting appears to be similarly divided into
reflexive and voluntary orienting processes. Hill et al. (2010)
used a social gaze cueing paradigm to demonstrate that orienting
to social stimuli involves divisible reflexive and voluntary
processes, analogous to non-social orienting. By varying the
amount of time between the onset of a face and a target
stimulus (stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA) and whether the
gaze cue was predictive of the target location, they were able to
show the time courses of the separable reflexive and voluntary
social orienting systems. In particular, they demonstrated a
facilitation effect for congruent (i.e., gaze direction corresponds
to target location) relative to incongruent trials when the SOA
was short, which is indicative of reflexive social orienting.
When the congruency of the trials was held constant and
the predictive value of the gaze cue was examined, the
predictive cues resulted in response facilitation relative to non-
predictive cues when the SOA was longer (200ms or more).
This slower onset of response facilitation for predictive trials
represents voluntary control. Therefore, their experiments were
very important for demonstrating two distinct yet interacting
processes involved in orienting to social stimuli in adult
subjects.
Since autistic individuals orient less to social cues such as
eyes and facial expressions than do typical individuals in many
contexts (Dawson et al., 1998; Klin et al., 2002; Guillon et al.,
2014), many studies have attempted to look at whether people
with ASD show social attention deficits. Although orienting
based on central non-social cues seems intact (Senju et al.,
2004; Greene et al., 2011; Pruett et al., 2011), many studies
have been inconclusive and have produced conflicting results
with regards to social orienting (see Nation and Penny, 2008;
Landry and Parker, 2013 for reviews). Some studies have found
a lack of reflexive orienting to social gaze cues in children
with autism (Ristic et al., 2005; Goldberg et al., 2008; Gillespie-
Lynch et al., 2013), while others have found no differences
from TD children (Chawarska et al., 2003; Swettenham et al.,
2003; Kylliäinen and Hietanen, 2004; Senju et al., 2004; Greene
et al., 2011; Pruett et al., 2011). It is important to note that
none of these studies utilized and truly separated reflexive
and voluntary conditions. In all of these studies that used a
“predictive,” or voluntary, condition (Senju et al., 2004; Ristic
et al., 2005; Pruett et al., 2011), those conditions were only
80% predictive and oftentimes included a stimulus-driven or
reflexive cueing component. Consequently, these measurements
of voluntary cue effects may still be confounded by reflexive
orienting influences, thus complicating interpretation of results.
Since social attention can be broken down into reflexive and
voluntary orienting processes, and given conflicting findings in
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laboratory studies of social orienting in ASD, it is feasible that
autistic individuals’ impairments are specific to a certain kind of
attention.
In particular, it is possible that the voluntary, but not the
reflexive, aspect of social orienting is selectively impaired in ASD.
Since most of these studies have focused primarily on reflexive
orienting and found no differences in ASD, it is feasible that
reflexive social orienting truly is intact in ASD. Conversely, a few
studies have raised the possibility that specifically voluntary social
orienting is deficient (Senju et al., 2004; Hill et al., 2010). This is
supported by the fact that Klin et al. (2002) reported that there
was no correlation between amount of time spent fixating on eyes
and social competence. This might suggest that individuals with
ASD do not find the eyes particularly helpful or meaningful (Klin
et al., 2002), and this lack of correlation may be closely related to
the more voluntary aspects of social attention. If voluntary social
orienting is selectively impaired, this may explain why many
of the previously mentioned studies have found no differences
in social orienting. Since subtle deficits in voluntary orienting
may have been washed out or masked by normal or even hyper
reflexive orienting effects, this might also help explain why many
more naturalistic studies have found social orienting differences
in ASD (Greene et al., 2011). These types of studies may be
inherently more context-dependent, relying more heavily on
voluntary orienting processes.
Therefore, it is important to develop a method that can
adequately probe each of these orienting processes while
controlling for the other to see whether one, but not the other,
is impaired in ASD. Adapting Hill et al. (2010) paradigm for
a tablet may be a promising approach because a tablet-based
approach has recently been shown to be an effective tool for
measuring reflexive versus voluntary non-social orienting (Zhang
et al., 2013). Since tablets are simple, portable, less intimidating
for children, and easier to operate, they may be especially useful
for measuring social orienting differences in the ASD population.
Moreover, a tablet-based application is an especially promising
avenue for the development of future interventions. If children
with autism are able to reflexively orient to social stimuli, it may
be feasible to develop tablet-based applications to train them
to use that social information in a more goal-directed manner,
i.e., improve their voluntary social orienting and/or responses
to particular social expressions and gaze signals. Importantly, a
social cueing task like the one already mentioned may provide
the basis for such a training method, especially if developed in a
simple gaming format on an accessible, portable, and easy-to-use
platform, such as a tablet device.
Thus, the current study has two primary aims. First, we
investigate differences in reflexive and voluntary social orienting
in children with ASD, and we hypothesize that these individuals
will be selectively impaired in voluntary social orienting but not
reflexive social orienting. Second, we hope to establish the tablet
as a viable means of measuring reflexive and voluntary social
cueing effects in this and potentially other clinical populations.
We hope that this work will improve our understanding of
social differences in ASD and pave the way for the development
of tablet-based interventions to target specific social attention
deficits.
EXPERIMENT 1
In this first experiment, we use an application on an iPad
2 to measure reflexive versus voluntary social orienting in
children with and without high-functioning ASD. We aim to
improve upon previous social orienting experimental designs
by having 100 and 50% predictive conditions each with the
same congruent and incongruent trials, allowing us to separately
examine the effect of congruency (reflexive orienting) while
keeping predictability constant, and predictability (voluntary
orienting) while keeping congruency constant.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The study was approved by The University of Texas Health
Science Center Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects
and was in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Before participating, all subjects provided their informed assent
with parental consent and were debriefed following their
participation. High-functioning ASD subjects were recruited
from two schools around the Houston area that specialize
in high-functioning autism. Typically developing (TD) control
subjects were recruited by word of mouth and approved flyers
and matched on age and gender as closely as possible to the
ASD subjects. None of the control subjects had ever received
an ASD diagnosis. With the exception of two subjects, ASD
diagnosis was confirmed with a questionnaire conducted over
the phone (8), authenticated with medical records at the school
(3), or both (5). Phone interviews included questions regarding
the age at which symptoms were first noticed, when was the
date of ASD diagnosis, how old was the subject when diagnosed,
details of the diagnosis (e.g., Asperger’s or PDD-NOS), and the
name of the doctor and clinic that issued the diagnosis. Of 18
recruited ASD subjects, 3 were excluded from further analysis
whose medical records did not indicate any ASD diagnosis. One
additional subject was excluded due to a confounding condition
of severe language impairment and a low verbal subscore on the
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI-III; Wechsler,
1991), more than two standard deviations outside of the normal
range. The remaining subjects included 15 TD controls [mean
age = 9.13 (±1.96) years old, 6 (40%) girls] and 14 subjects with
ASD [mean age= 9.57 (±2.10) years old, 2 (14%) girls].
Stimuli
An application for the iPad 2 with tasks based on the Hill et al.
(2010) study was developed in the lab and used to conduct the
experiment. This application contains three social cueing tasks.
In each of these tasks, there is a solid white circle (diameter =
1.4 cm) that first appears in the center of the dark iPad screen
that serves as a finger fixation point. Four different gray scale
face images from two female individuals act as the gaze cues,
each with gaze averted 45 degrees to the right and left (face
stimuli identical to Hill et al., 2010). The target is a solid white
square (1 cm) presented to the left or the right of the finger
fixation point. A trial is initiated by touching and holding the
finger fixation point, and after a delay (833ms), a face briefly
appears for 17ms. Then, the target is presented to the left or
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the right at one of five stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs): 25,
58, 174, 523, or 805ms. These SOAs were chosen so that we
would have two shorter SOAs to see reflexive cue effects (which
are typically early and short-lived), one intermediate point, and
two longer SOAs so as to see voluntary cue effects (which should
emerge around 200ms). The target remains on screen until the
screen is re-touched. Response locations and times of finger
lift off were recorded using the iPad 2’s capacitive screen with
a spatial resolution of 52 pixels per cm and a frame refresh
rate of 60Hz. Response times were adjusted by subtracting the
externally-measured (with photodiode, microphone and storage
oscilloscope; see Sereno et al., 2014) average delay of detecting a
touch event on the capacitive device (73.88ms). The SD of the
delay was approximately 5.9ms. Comparing this variability to
the mean RT (on average 353.5ms), the coefficient of variation
(CV = SD/mean) was less than 2%. In addition, this variation
in the delay is less than 15% of the total variation in RT (SD,
on average about 41.1ms), including between subjects variation.
Hence, this variability was well below the RT variations in
individual human performance we measured.
Study Design
The experiment consisted of two conditions (Figure 1). In
Condition 1 (Non-predictive condition, i.e., MixedGaze, or MG),
FIGURE 1 | MixedGaze, AntiGaze, and ProGaze tablet-based
gaze-cueing tasks. A schematic of our two conditions (Condition 1:
Non-predictive; Condition 2: Predictive) and three social gaze-cueing tasks
(MixedGaze, AntiGaze, and ProGaze). Each condition contained the same 80
trials, half of which were congruent (i.e., target appears in same direction as
gaze) and half of which were incongruent (i.e., target appears in opposite
direction from gaze).
the target appeared in the same direction as the gaze cue
(congruent) in half of the trials and in the opposite direction
(incongruent) in the other half; therefore, the gaze cue was
not informative (i.e., 50% predictive). Condition 1 consisted
of 80 trials (2 congruencies × 5 SOAs × 4 cue images × 2
repetitions). In Condition 2 (Predictive condition), gaze cues
were always 100% predictive of the location of the target.
Condition 2 contained two subtasks: ProGaze (PG), in which
the target always appeared in the same direction as the gaze
cue, and AntiGaze (AG), in which the target always appeared
in the opposite direction. Each subtask consisted of 40 trials
(5 SOAs × 4 cue images × 2 repetitions). The combined 80
trials in the two subtasks of Condition 2 were identical to the
80 trials used in Condition 1. The order of conditions, as well
as the order of Condition 2 subtasks (always kept together), was
counterbalanced across participants, creating four possible task
orders.
In this experiment, Group (TD Control vs. ASD) was
the between-subject independent variable, and Congruency
(Congruent vs. Incongruent), Predictability (Predictive vs. Non-
predictive), and SOA (25, 58, 174, 523, 805ms) were within-
subject independent variables. The dependent variable was
response time (RT), measured as the time from when the target
is presented to when the subject initiates their response by lifting
their finger from the center fixation point. The number of errors
was also recorded, but, given very few errors (0.99 and 3.03% for
Control and ASD groups, respectively), they were not analyzed.
Procedure
TDControl subjects were tested in a darkened testing room at the
University of Texas Medical School in Houston (UTMSH). The
TD control subjects and their parents were compensated with
$20 for their time and for travel/parking costs, and the children
were also awarded with small toys. High-functioning autistic
subjects were recruited from two schools around the Houston
area that specialize in high-functioning autism, and they were
tested directly at their schools in a darkened testing room with
an environment mimicking the Medical School testing room.
Because there was no parental travel/parking costs involved,
these children were not compensatedmonetarily but were instead
awarded with toys following their participation.
All subjects were first given instructions and allowed to
practice a few (4–6) trials for each of the tasks in the same order
that they would complete the experiment. This was to generally
acquaint them with the iPad and the overall tasks so that they
could see the differences between the subtasks and so that they
were able to ask questions and have ample practice with each one.
In the Condition 1 task (MG), subjects were told that sometimes
the target would appear in the same direction that the eyes were
looking, and other times it would appear away from where the
eyes were looking. Therefore, it was emphasized that the eyes
would not tell them where the target would appear. For the
Condition 2 tasks, subjects were told that the target would always
appear in the same direction (PG subtask) or opposite direction
(AG subtask) from where the eyes of the face were looking. For
each condition and subtask, they were told to touch the target
square as quickly but as accurately as possible.
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Before performing each task, subjects were prompted to recall
that task’s instructions (e.g., PG: In this game, will the eyes of the
face be looking toward the square or away from the square?), and
corrected if they answered incorrectly. This was to ensure that
they understood the task-specific instructions. Then, they were
given a few more practice trials to make sure they had sufficient
practice and understood the task before the full experimental data
was collected.
Verbal and Matrix reasoning subtests from the Wechsler
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI-III) were also
administered to all ASD subjects (Wechsler, 1991). The
estimated IQ scores from the two WASI subtasks ranged from
80-133 with a mean (±SD) of 100.71 (±17.18), suggesting no
difference in IQ [t(13) = 0.2, p = 0.9] from the average IQ score
(100) of age-matched TD children (Wechsler, 1991).
Data Analysis
A MATLAB script was used to extract data and trim errors and
outliers. Responses were considered an “error” if the distance
between target location and iPad-calculated location of subject’s
response was greater than 3.3◦ (1.9 cm). The error rate for the TD
Control group was 0.99% (PG: 1.15%, AG: 0.66%, MG: 1.07%),
and for the ASD group it was 3.03% (PG: 3.11%, AG: 3.11%, MG:
2.95%). Once these error trials were excluded, additional trials
were filtered out from the final analysis if their RT was less than
150ms, greater than 800ms, ormore than 2.5 standard deviations
away from their mean RT for that particular SOA. In addition,
we removed trials where the subject lifted their finger but did not
respond in a timely fashion (i.e., duration of movement greater
than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean movement duration
for that particular SOA). Together, these trimming procedures
resulted in the removal of 3.08% of non-error trials (PG: 3%, AG:
3.17%, MG: 3.08%) in the control group and 9.46% (PG: 8.39%,
AG: 9.64%, MG: 9.91%) in the ASD group.
Once error trials were removed and the data was filtered,
each subject’s remaining RTs comprised the set of observations
for each of the five SOAs and each of four different Trial Types
(Figure 1): MG congruent (Condition 1, right), MG incongruent
(Condition 1, left), PG (congruent; Condition 2, right panel), and
AG (incongruent; Condition 2, left panel), trials. These four Trial
Types were used to evaluate the following four Cue Effects:
1. Reflexive orienting in non-predictive (NP) condition
(Condition 1)=MG Incongruent RT vs. MG Congruent RT.
2. Reflexive orienting in predictive (P) condition (Condition
2)= AG (Incongruent) RT vs. PG (Congruent) RT.
3. Voluntary orienting in congruent trials =MG Congruent RT
(Condition 1, right) vs. PG RT (Condition 2, right panel).
4. Voluntary orienting in incongruent trials =MG Incongruent
RT (Condition 1, left) vs. AG RT (Condition 2, left panel).
Given there were repeated measures in each subject and different
variability between groups and among SOAs, a mixed effect
analysis was first performed on RT for each group and each of
5 SOAs to examine Cue Effects among the four different Trial
Types (PG congruent, AG incongruent, MG congruent, and MG
incongruent). In this mixed effect model, Trial Type is both
a fixed effect and a random effect with compound symmetric
covariance structure, and Subject is a random effect with an
autoregressive order 1 covariance structure.
To examine group differences in Cue Effects, we performed a
secondmixed effect analysis. In these analyses, the fixed effect was
Group (TD Control and ASD), and both Trial Type and Subject
were the random effects with the same covariance structure as
in the first analysis. Again, Cue Effects between Groups were
compared at each SOA.
Since each subject only completed 8 of each trial type for each
SOA, combining some of the SOAs that were expected to be
measuring the same process simplifies the presentation but does
not change the findings we report. Hence we repeated the above
analyses after combining the two early SOAs (25 and 58ms) and
the two late SOAs (523 and 805ms) to make three levels of delay:
short (25 and 58ms), intermediate (174ms), and long (523 and
805ms). These collapsed analyses (with 3 levels of delay) are
presented below in the Results, and estimated means and mean
differences from these analyses are used in the Figures. Estimated
means (±SE), cue effects, and significance levels for the collapsed
delays analyses are presented in Supplementary Tables 1, 2. A
p < 0.05 was considered as statistically significant.
Results
Reflexive Orienting in Non-predictive (NP) Condition
As illustrated in Figures 2A (TD) and 2B (ASD) and in
Supplementary Table 1, both groups show significant reflexive
facilitation at the long delay [TD: 14.4ms (± 6.4), t(56) = 2.3,
p = 0.028; ASD: 23.9ms (± 10.8), t(52) = 2.2, p = 0.031]. In
other words, by about 523ms, both TD and ASD subjects are
faster at congruent than incongruent trials even though the gaze
cue is not predictive of the target location. This finding at the
long delay is consistent with the findings at SOA of 523ms in
the uncollapsed data [TD: 20.4ms (± 8.2), t(56) = 2.5, p = 0.016;
ASD: 34.5ms (± 16.0), t(52) = 2.2, p = 0.036]. Although the ASD
group shows greater reflexive cue effects at the long delay [Group
difference = 9.6ms (± 12.3)], none of these Group differences
reach statistical significance (Figure 3A; p’s > 0.2).
Reflexive Orienting in Predictive (P) Condition
As illustrated in Figures 2C (TD) and 2D (ASD) and in
Supplementary Table 1, neither group shows significant reflexive
facilitation at any of the three delays (p’s > 0.1). However,
reflexive facilitation at the short delay is greater in the ASD
than in the TD control group, and this difference is significant
[Figure 3B; Group difference = 28.0ms (± 13.5), t(1675) = 2.1,
p = 0.039]. From the uncollapsed data, it appears that this
group difference emerges at the shortest SOA of 25ms [Group
difference = 49.1ms (± 16.2), t(780) = 3.0, p = 0.003] and
disappears by SOA of 58ms [Group difference= 5.0ms (± 17.6),
p = 0.8].
Voluntary Orienting in Congruent Trials
As illustrated in Figure 4A and Supplementary Table 2, the TD
Control group shows a significant voluntary cue effect at both the
intermediate [22.7ms (± 8.6), t(56) = 2.6, p = 0.011] and long
delays [21.1ms (± 6.4), t(56) = 3.3, p = 0.002]. This was also true
of the uncollapsed data for the intermediate (same as collapsed
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 December 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 453
Kirchgessner et al. Reflexive and Voluntary Social Orienting in ASD
FIGURE 2 | Estimated mean reflexive social orienting cue effects in TD control and ASD children. Estimated mean reflexive cue effects in TD controls (first
column; A,C) and subjects with ASD (second column; B,D) in non-predictive (top row; A,B) and predictive (bottom row; C,D) conditions. A star indicates a significant
cue effect (*p < 0.05). Error bars represent one standard error.
data) and long SOAs [SOA= 523ms: 14.4ms (± 8.3), t(56) = 1.7,
p = 0.087; SOA = 805ms: 28.0ms (± 8.8), t(56) = 3.2, p =
0.002], although the cue effect at SOA = 523ms was marginal.
The positive cue effects in the control group at these longer delays
reflect the advantage of predictive over non-predictive trials and
suggest that in TD children this first becomes significant at an
SOA of 174ms. In the uncollapsed data in the TD Control group,
we find a negative cue effect at the shortest SOA [−21.3ms (±
10.4), t(56) = −2.1, p = 0.045], similar to previous work in
normal adults with this paradigm (Hill et al., 2010); however this
cue effect is not significant in the collapsed data at the short delay
(Figure 4A; p = 0.4). In contrast, there are no significant cue
effects in the ASD group (Figure 4B, p’s > 0.4), meaning that
ASD children’s response times are about the same in the P and
NP conditions and thus they show no indication of using the
predictive cues. The only effect that approaches significance is a
marginal negative cue effect at SOA = 523ms in the uncollapsed
data [−27.9ms (± 16.1), t(52) = −1.7, p = 0.089], suggesting
that if anything, ASD subjects are slower when the gaze cue has
predictive value. Further, voluntary facilitation is significantly
greater in the TD control than in the ASD group at both the
intermediate [Group difference= 33.0ms (± 15.4), t(774)= 2.1,
p = 0.033] and long delays [Group difference= 29.1ms (± 12.3),
t(1651) = 2.4, p = 0.018; Figure 5A].
Voluntary Orienting in Incongruent Trials
For this voluntary cueing condition, as illustrated in Figures 4C
(TD) and 4D (ASD) as well as in Supplementary Table 2, the
findings are similar in that there are significant voluntary cue
effects at the long delay for the TD control group [32.0ms (±6.4),
t(56) = 5.0, p < 0.001] but not for the ASD group at either the
intermediate or long delays [p’s > 0.5]. Furthermore, voluntary
facilitation at the long delay is significantly greater in the TD
than in the ASD group [Group difference = 27.2ms (±12.3),
t(1651) = 2.2, p = 0.027; Figure 5B]. There are a few small
differences in this incongruent Voluntary condition from the
congruent Voluntary condition. Namely, in the TD control group
in the incongruent Voluntary condition (Figure 4C), significant
voluntary cue effects are not significant at the intermediate SOA
but emerge at slightly longer delays [also true in the uncollapsed
data, SOAs of 174ms: 6.0ms (± 8.7), p = 0.5; vs. 523ms: 27.0ms
(± 8.3), t(56) = 3.2, p = 0.002]. Given the lack of a significant
voluntary cue effect in the TD group at the intermediate SOA,
there are also no significant group differences at this SOA
(Figure 5B). Another difference from the congruent trials is that
in the ASD group, there is a marginally significant negative
cue effect at the short delay [−18.9ms (± 9.9), t(52) = −1.9,
p = 0.062; Figure 4D], and this results in a significant group
difference at the short delay [32.9ms (± 13.7), t(1675) = 2.4,
p = 0.016; Figure 5B].
Discussion
Differences between Non-Predictive and Predictive
Reflexive Social Orienting Cue Effects
First, our findings demonstrate intact reflexive social orienting
in children with ASD. Like the TD control group, they were
consistently faster in congruent than in incongruent trials of the
non-predictive (NP) condition after 25ms, and this facilitory
reflexive cue effect reached significance at the long delays
(>523ms; Figures 2A,B). Further, there was some evidence of
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FIGURE 3 | Reflexive social orienting is intact or enhanced in children
with ASD relative to TD controls. Comparison of estimated mean reflexive
cue effects between TD control (white) and ASD (gray) groups in
non-predictive (A) and predictive (B) conditions. Estimated mean cue effects
and error bars are the same as in Figure 2. A star indicates a significant group
difference (*p < 0.05).
heightened reflexive social orienting in individuals with ASD.
Namely, there was a significant group difference with greater
early facilitation demonstrated by the ASD subjects in the
predictive (P) condition (Figure 3B). Although there were no
significant group differences in the NP condition (Figure 3A),
in agreement with the P condition finding, cue effects by the
ASD subjects in the NP condition were consistently larger than
in the control group at intermediate and long delays, albeit non-
significantly. Thus, taken together, our findings suggest reflexive
social orienting is intact or even enhanced in ASD individuals.
Although to our knowledge no previous studies have argued
for enhanced reflexive social orienting in children with ASD,
Senju et al. (2004) did find that their ASD group showed a
greater cue validity effect (i.e., faster responses on congruent than
incongruent trials) than the control group in a non-predictive
gaze cueing task. Further research is needed to determine
whether this aspect of social orienting is truly enhanced.
Still, children with ASD strongly demonstrated reflexive social
orienting, and therefore this aspect of attention appears to be
intact in this group.
Secondly, the time course of reflexive cue effects differed in
NP and P conditions with significant facilitation occurring for
both groups at the long delay in theNP condition (Figures 2A,B),
but not in the P condition (Figures 2C,D). Based on previous
work (Hill et al., 2010), we did expect there to be a difference
in P and NP reflexive cue effects at the later SOAs. That is,
in the P condition, where subjects know where the target is
going to appear, we expected any automatic reflexively-generated
cueing differences between a congruent and incongruent cue to
go away with the growing influence of voluntary control. When
this happens, voluntary control directs (or re-directs) attention
to the correct upcoming target location, enabling a faster
response in both the PG and AG subtasks and thus reducing
the reflexive facilitory cue effect to zero at long SOAs. On the
other hand, in the NP condition, where subjects understand that
the cue is meaningless in predicting upcoming target location,
we have previously reported that a social cue does not produce
inhibition of return at longer SOAs but rather continues to show
evidence of reflexive facilitation at 500 and 750ms (Hill et al.,
2010). Consistent with the previous adult findings, both groups
demonstrated significant reflexive facilitation at long (523 and
805ms) delays in the NP condition (Figures 2A,B).
There were some unanticipated findings at the early delays
where we expected to find reflexive social facilitation. Most
importantly, neither group showed significant facilitation at short
SOAs in the NP condition (Figures 2A,B). Specifically, although
the TD group did show a nonsignificant positive cue effect (at
the short delay in the collapsed data: 9.2ms), the ASD group
hovered close to 0 (−2.1ms). Additionally, in the P condition,
we observed a nonsignificant negative reflexive cue effect in
our control group at the short delay (−12.6ms, Figure 2C),
whereas the ASD group showed a nonsignificant positive effect
(15.1ms, Figure 2D). A negative cue effect in the TD control
group means that these subjects were responding faster on AG
compared to PG trials at short SOAs. This was unexpected
based on previous findings reported by Hill et al. (2010) and
our own data from typical adults who completed these same
tablet-based social gaze tasks (unpublished data); in both cases,
we have observed significant positive cue effects at the earliest
delays which diminish around 200ms. It is possible that this
negative cue effect in TD Control participants was the result of
these young subjects’ perception of the AG task as a tricky or
“harder” task, leading to an increased level of arousal on the AG
trials (faster RTs) that shifted this difference curve down. Given
control subjects were tested in a lab setting in a Medical School
whereas the ASD children were tested within a testing room
within their own school, it is also possible that control children
were more cautious of the testing instructions in an unfamiliar
location.
Lack of Evidence of Voluntary Social Gaze Cueing in
ASD
Meanwhile, although we observed robust voluntary social
orienting effects in our control group after 174ms, the ASD group
did not show any such effects (Figures 4, 5). Starting around
174ms, TD controls demonstrated consistently significant
positive voluntary cue effects in both congruent and incongruent
trials (Figures 4A,C); in other words, given time for voluntary
control to become operational and enable the advantageous use
of the gaze cue, TD participants became significantly faster at P
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FIGURE 4 | Estimated mean voluntary social orienting cue effects in TD control and ASD children. Estimated mean voluntary cue effects in TD controls (first
column; A,C) and subjects with ASD (second column; B,D) in congruent (top row; A,B) and incongruent (bottom row; C,D) trials. A star indicates a significant cue
effect (*p < 0.05) and a cross indicates a marginally significant cue effect (†p < 0.10). Error bars represent one standard error.
than NP conditions. However, the ASD group differed from the
TD control group in that they did not show any of these effects
(Figures 4B,D). These group differences (Figure 5) suggest that
the ASD subjects are not using the predictive gaze cues to their
advantage, despite having been explicitly told that the gaze cue
will help them locate and thus respond faster to the target in the
P condition. In sum, the TD control group demonstrates clear
use of voluntary control in social orienting while the ASD group
does not.
Broader Deficits?: Social and Non-social Orienting
However, an alternative possible interpretation of our findings
in Experiment 1 is that these differences in voluntary social
orienting are not social, per se, but rather reflect broader executive
function deficits that affect both social and non-social voluntary
orienting (see Hill, 2004 for a review). That is, deficits in the
voluntary social gaze orienting tasks could reflect a broader
problem in voluntary orienting. The antisaccade task, which is a
traditional test of non-social voluntary orienting, is often used to
measuremore general problems with executive functions (Sereno
et al., 2009). A recent tablet-based version of the antisaccade
task (“AntiPoint”) that measures touch responses rather than eye
movements has also been used to measure executive dysfunction
(Zhang et al., 2013). If high functioning ASD participants have
a broader deficit in executive function, they should demonstrate
dysfunction on the AntiPoint task as well. However, many studies
have found that children with autism are not uniformly impaired
in all realms of executive functioning (Griffith et al., 1999;
Liss et al., 2001; Geurts et al., 2004). For instance, Liss et al.
(2001) investigated executive functions in TD children, children
with developmental language disorder, and children with high-
functioning ASD using a number of tests. The only observed
differences were on measures of perseveration in the ASD group,
but even these differences disappeared when verbal IQ was used
as a covariate. Thus, we hypothesized that we would not detect
any differences between the TD control and high-functioning
ASD groups on either ProPoint (reflexive orienting) or AntiPoint
(voluntary orienting) tasks, suggesting that our findings in
Experiment 1 indicate differences in voluntary orienting specific
to social processes rather than a more general deficit in executive
functioning.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment, we tested the same two groups of subjects
on two additional non-social orienting tasks: ProPoint and
AntiPoint. We hypothesized that high-functioning ASD subjects
would not differ from control subjects in either the ProPoint or
AntiPoint task, suggesting the findings in Experiment 1 with our
population of ASD subjects do not indicate a more generalized
voluntary orienting deficit.
Materials and Methods
Participants
All control subjects (15) and 13 of the 14 ASD subjects who
participated in Experiment 1 also participated in Experiment 2.
Stimuli
In these tasks, the central fixation point is the same as in the social
tasks but is surrounded by four square boxes, each 4 cm from the
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FIGURE 5 | Voluntary social orienting is deficient in children with ASD
relative to TD controls. Comparison of estimated mean voluntary cue effects
between TD control (white) and ASD (gray) groups in congruent (A) and
incongruent (B) trials. Estimated mean cue effects and error bars are the same
as in Figure 4. A star indicates a significant group difference (*p < 0.05).
central fixation point. These boxes remain on screen throughout
the duration of the task, and they indicate the possible locations
of the targets. The target (white square, 0.8 cm) appears in any
of the four target locations 480ms after the fixation point is
touched.
Study Design
Experiment 2 consists of two subtasks and uses the same design
as was used in the Zhang et al. (2013) study (Figure 6). The
ProPoint (PP) task is a test of reflexive orienting because it
requires the subject to simply touch the response box containing
the target. The AntiPoint (AP) task is a test of voluntary
orienting. In this task, the subject must inhibit their reflexive
response to touch the box where the target appears and instead
program and execute a willful response to touch the opposite
response box. Each of these subtasks is made up of 48 trials. Task
is a within-subject independent variable and Group is a between-
subject independent variable. The order of the PP and AP tasks
was counterbalanced across subjects.
Procedure
As before, the dependent variable is RT, measured as the time
from when the target is presented to when the subject initiates
their response by lifting their finger from the center fixation
FIGURE 6 | ProPoint and AntiPoint non-social orienting tasks displayed
on iPad screen. A schematic of the ProPoint (A) and AntiPoint (B) non-social
orienting tasks used in Experiment 2 (figure from Zhang et al., 2013). ProPoint
(A) is a test of reflexive orienting while AntiPoint (B) is a test of voluntary
orienting.
point. All subjects were given the instructions and 4–6 practice
trials before starting each task.
Data Analysis
A MATLAB script similar to the one used in Experiment 1 was
used to extract data, trim errors and outliers, and calculate subject
mean RTs used in the analysis. TD controls had an error rate of
3.23% (PP: 1.64%, AP: 4.76%), and ASD subjects had an error
rate of 3.70% (PP: 1.73%, AP: 5.60%). Once these error trials were
excluded, additional trials were filtered out from the final analysis
according to the same criteria as in Experiment 1 except that the
upper cutoff was set to 1200ms to account for the longer RTs
in the AP task. Consequently, for TD control and ASD subjects
respectively, 5.07% (PP: 4.44%, AP: 5.69%) and 8.09% (PP: 5.61%,
AP: 10.58%) of the remaining data were filtered out from the
final RT analysis. As in Experiment 1, a mixed effect analysis
was used to compare mean RT between groups for each task. In
this analysis, Group (TD and ASD) is a fixed effect while Subject
is a random effect with an autoregressive order 1 covariance
structure. Estimated mean RTs from this analysis are presented
in Figure 7.
Results
As illustrated in Figure 7, there were no significant group
differences in RTs in the PP task [p > 0.1; estimated mean
RTs (± SE): 399.3ms (±13.5) and 419.2ms (±9.9) for TD and
ASD, respectively]. In contrast, the ASD group is significantly
slower than the TD control group in the AP task [t(26) = 2.1,
p = 0.036; estimated mean RTs (± SE): 566.0 (±19.0) ms and
608.1ms (±14.1), for TD and ASD, respectively].
Discussion
Our findings demonstrate no group differences on the ProPoint
(PP) test of reflexive orienting but moderate differences on the
AntiPoint (AP) test of voluntary orienting. Specifically, the ASD
group took longer to respond in the AP task, which required that
they inhibit their reflexive response to an illuminated target and
instead press the opposite target. These results suggest deficits
in non-social orienting and point to some overarching problems
with voluntary orienting and its concomitant aspects of executive
function in our sample of children with ASD.
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FIGURE 7 | Estimated mean response times for TD control and ASD
children in non-social orienting tasks. Response times (estimated means
from mixed effect analysis, in ms) by TD control (white) and ASD (gray)
subjects in ProPoint (reflexive) and AntiPoint (voluntary) non-social orienting
tasks. A star indicates a significant group difference (*p < 0.05). Error bars
represent one standard error.
It is possible that our ASD group was not uniformly impaired
on our task of voluntary non-social orienting. Although our
study was too small to further explore the issue of heterogeneity
in our sample, there was no correlation between estimated IQs
[Group mean (± SD): 102.3 (± 16.8)] and either PP or AP RTs
for the ASD subjects (p’s > 0.6). In future research, it would be
interesting to investigate in a larger ASD sample whether any
factors such as IQ, verbal fluency, or specific subdiagnoses of ASD
could predict whether voluntary orienting deficits are broad or
specific to social orienting.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Summary of Main Findings
In this study, we were able to isolate and define particular deficits
in orienting behavior in a group of high-functioning autism
spectrum disorder (ASD) children. First, we demonstrate
intact reflexive social orienting in children with ASD.
Furthermore, we found some evidence suggestive of enhanced
reflexive social orienting in children with ASD compared to
controls (non-predictive condition, long delay; Figure 3A).
In contrast, these same ASD children demonstrated deficient
voluntary social orienting compared to the TD Control
group (Figure 5). Together, these findings show that there
are important differences in reflexive and voluntary social
orienting in children with ASD that may explain previous
discrepancies in the literature and, more importantly, prove
key in the development and targeting of strategies and
interventions.
Intact Reflexive Social Orienting in ASD
First, our findings suggest that reflexive social orienting is
preserved, or perhaps even enhanced, in the ASD group
compared to TD controls. In the non-predictive (NP) condition,
both ASD and control groups were significantly faster at
congruent than incongruent trials at SOA of 523ms and at the
long delay (i.e., SOAs 523 and 783ms combined) in the collapsed
data. The reflexive cue effects were consistently greater in the
ASD group than in the control group, although these group
differences did not reach significance. Moreover, in the predictive
(P) condition, children with ASD demonstrated a significantly
greater facilitative reflexive cue effect than that of the control
children at the short delay (i.e., SOAs 25 and 58ms combined),
raising the possibility of enhanced reflexive social orienting in
children with ASD.
This evidence of intact reflexive social orienting is also
consistent with the majority of previous studies investigating
social orienting in ASD (Chawarska et al., 2003; Swettenham
et al., 2003; Kylliäinen and Hietanen, 2004; Senju et al., 2004;
Greene et al., 2011; Pruett et al., 2011). A few studies have
reported deficient reflexive social orienting (Ristic et al., 2005;
Goldberg et al., 2008; Gillespie-Lynch et al., 2013), but they
differed from the current study in a number of important
ways. First, Gillespie-Lynch et al. (2013) used a much younger
sample (mean age = 4.75) and only used SOAs 400ms and
less in a NP task, which was earlier than we observed reflexive
facilitation (at SOA of 523ms). Further, both Goldberg et al.
(2008) and Ristic et al. (2005) studies utilized line drawings of
faces with eyes, which arguably reduces the social relevance of
the stimuli (Hill et al., 2010). Other differences in methodologies,
such as in how and for how long the gaze cue was presented
and whether important comparisons were made between- or
within-subjects, likely account for the discrepancies in these
and other experiments using schematic cues (Ristic et al.,
2005; Goldberg et al., 2008; Greene et al., 2011; Pruett et al.,
2011).
Deficient Voluntary Social Orienting in ASD
Our ASD sample, despite being on the higher-functioning end
of the spectrum and despite receiving explicit instructions about
how a central gaze cue could help their performance, did not
demonstrate voluntary social orienting using gaze cues. This lack
of facilitation distinguished them from the control subjects, who
became significantly faster at responding to targets cued by a
predictive than a non-predictive gaze cue at SOA intervals that
allowed sufficient time to process the direction of the gaze cue (at
least 174ms).
Our findings of impaired voluntary social orienting in ASD
are important and differ in several respects from previous studies.
First, we used a 100% predictive voluntary condition. Some
previous studies have used "Predictive” conditions (Senju et al.,
2004; Ristic et al., 2005; Pruett et al., 2011) where the gaze cues
were only 80% predictive as compared to 100% predictive in
our study. A more substantial difference that could account for
discrepancies between studies with regards to whether voluntary
orienting is intact or impaired may be due to confounded
reflexive and voluntary processes. For instance, Pruett et al.
(2011) and Ristic et al. (2005) reported intact voluntary social
orienting in ASD in their 80% predictive conditions, but since
the predicted trials were also the congruent trials, this design
conflates voluntary with reflexive processes. Therefore, their
lack of differences may be more indicative of intact reflexive
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rather than intact voluntary orienting in ASD. In contrast, Senju
and colleagues, who did report differences in voluntary social
orienting, used an 80% predictive condition in which the target
appeared in the opposite direction from the gaze cue 80% of
the time (i.e., 80% incongruent trials, 20% congruent), and this
crucial difference, similar to our own study, may account for its
differential findings from Pruett et al. (2011) and Ristic et al.
(2005). In the present study, we compared a voluntary (100%
predictive) condition to the exact same trials in a reflexive (50%
predictive, i.e., non-predictive) condition. In this way, we were
able to hold the congruency of the trials constant and look
specifically at how subjects’ response times differed when the
gaze cue was 100% predictive from when it was non-predictive.
However, findings from the Senju et al. (2004) study are perhaps
most consistent with our own because their predictive condition
did not conflate reflexive with voluntary processes. Specifically,
they required the subjects to inhibit their reflexive response
and instead look in the opposite direction of the gaze cues,
separating voluntary from reflexive social orienting. In this
way, such a predictive condition is more purely indicative of
voluntary social orienting, which we, too, found to be impaired
in ASD.
However, another important difference between our study and
these previous studies is that in our tablet-based task, subjects’
responses were measured as the time to lift their finger from
the center fixation point (an initiation time, similar to Hill
et al., 2010), moving their finger to the appropriate target, and
touching the target. In contrast, these other studies have used
key presses to measure reaction times (Senju et al., 2004; Ristic
et al., 2005; Pruett et al., 2011), which include a movement
component. Hence, in future work it would be interesting
to examine whether there is a similar or different pattern of
findings between groups, for example in movement duration
or total (initiation plus duration) response times to touch the
target.
Non-social Orienting is Moderately
Impaired in Our Sample of ASD
Previous reports suggest children with ASD seem to be impaired
on some measures of executive functions but not others (Liss
et al., 2001; Geurts et al., 2004). Our results from Experiment 2
demonstrate impairments in executive function in our sample of
high-functioning ASD children, as measured by our voluntary
non-social orienting task. However, while interpreting these
results, it is important to bear in mind the issue of heterogeneity
within the autism population, especially when it comes to
executive dysfunction (Liss et al., 2001). For instance, Kelly
et al. (2013) found deficits on an antisaccade task in language-
impaired children with and without an ASD diagnosis, but
children with an ASD diagnosis but no language impairment
did not show these same deficits. In contrast, in Experiment 2
of our study of high-functioning ASD children, we did observe
significant differences between the TD control and ASD groups
on voluntary but not reflexive non-social orienting tasks. It is
possible that this group difference may have been driven by
a subset of our ASD sample. The small size of and restricted
range of language ability in our sample precluded us from
directly investigating the relationship between language ability
and general voluntary control. It is possible, therefore, that
the differences we report in voluntary social orienting may
be specific to social processes in some ASD subjects, but it
is clear that some of our ASD subjects possess more general
problems with voluntary control. Future studies are needed to
examine and sort out the possibility and source of heterogeneity
in ASD.
One promising avenue for future research on this topic would
be to investigate how heterogeneity of ASD phenotypes relates
to non-social voluntary orienting. Previous findings suggest
that gaze-following accuracy is impaired and correlated with
communicative skills in young children with autistic disorder
but not in those with pervasive developmental disorder-not
otherwise specified (PDD-NOS), a subtype of broader ASD
under the previous DSM-IV criteria (Falck-Ytter et al., 2012).
It is possible that more detailed measures of ASD diagnosis
and/or particular deficits (such as in language) in a broader
spectrum of ASD subjects may unearth important differences in
executive functions as measured by the antisaccade/AntiPoint
task within the ASD group (Kelly et al., 2013). Given the
heterogeneity of the ASD population, this is an important
question for the future development of therapies and training
tools. Although our findings suggest that such interventions
ought to primarily target voluntary social orienting, it is possible
that some individuals would benefit from broader training in
voluntary control.
CONCLUSION
Overall, our findings provide a novel and valuable contribution
to the understanding of social attention differences in ASD.
Although children with high-functioning ASD were able to
reflexively orient toward social gaze similarly to TD children,
they did not exhibit any evidence of voluntary social orienting.
In other words, when children with ASD are presented with a
face with a potentially valuable social cue (i.e., averted gaze),
their attention is automatically driven in the direction of that
gaze as it is in TD children. However, we found that ASD
children are not able to use this social cue in a voluntary, goal-
directed, or context-dependent way, such as to facilitate response
to a target when the gaze direction is 100% predictive of the
target location. Future research should aim to further explore
this difference and whether ASD individuals can be trained
to use this information and overcome this deficit. However,
the fact that predictive gaze cues are not facilitating these
individuals’ responses suggests that ASD individuals are not
able to voluntarily use social gaze cues and thus may not find
such cues particularly useful. This may help explain findings
such as from Klin and colleagues that these individuals look
at socially-relevant features, like eyes, significantly less than do
typical individuals. In fact, one could even argue that failure
to effectively use such information properly may train them
to avoid the eyes and seek information elsewhere. Reduced
eye contact in individuals with ASD may also be due to their
especially strong emotional responses to eyes (Dalton et al.,
2005), which could be in agreement with our finding of enhanced
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reflexive orienting in ASD. Our results are also consistent with
the viewpoint that orienting to social cues is not universally
impaired in ASD, but rather that deficits are specific and context-
dependent (Chawarska et al., 2012; Guillon et al., 2014). In
our view, different contexts will impose different demands on
the voluntary control of social attention, and this will often
result in observed social orienting deficits in ASD. Our findings
that these individuals have the automatic ability to orient their
attention using social stimuli, but are simply not doing so
voluntarily, raise the exciting possibility of intervening and
training this ability. For instance, tablet-based games similar
to our social orienting iPad application may be an especially
promising method of intervention. With these sorts of games,
it may be possible to train these individuals to use social
information to orient their attention in a more intentional, goal-
directed manner. Since social orienting is important not only
for everyday social interactions but also for other previously-
described cognitive abilities like understanding others’ actions,
Theory of Mind development and even for typical language
acquisition, such interventions may prove widely beneficial for
children with ASD.
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